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Labor and Employment

by W. Christopher Arbery
Valerie N. Njiiri**
and Valerie H. Barney***
The trial and appellate courts within the Eleventh Circuit handed
down a number of important opinions affecting labor and employment
law during the survey period from January 1, 2007 to December 31,
2007. These included significant decisions defining key terms under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX")' and there were notable decisions involving
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA")2 and the Family and Medical
Leave Act ("FMLA").3
I.

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

Reyna v.ConAgra Foods, Inc.
In Reyna v. ConAgra Foods, Inc. ,' the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Georgia, Athens Division, in a case of first
impression, found that section 806' of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act s protects
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1. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
4. 506 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (M.D. Ga. 2007).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. V 2005).
6. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18,
28, and 29 U.S.C.).
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employees who report allegations of fraud even if the allegations do not
relate to shareholder fraud.7
Because the case was before the court on the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, the court interpreted the facts in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs.' Scarlett Reyna and Maria Ortega worked
in the human resources department of a poultry processing plant owned
by ConAgra Foods, Inc. ("ConAgra") in Athens, Georgia. Reyna worked
as the Employment Coordinator and was responsible for hiring all
nonexempt employees. Ortega worked as the FMLA Coordinator and
assistant to the Benefits Coordinator, Denise Dimas. Ortega worked
primarily with hourly employees and did not generally have access to
the computer system containing information regarding managementlevel employees. Both employees reported to Angela Colquitt, the
Personnel Manager. The employees alleged that Colquitt often made
derogatory comments toward them based on their national origin and
instructed them not to hire certain demographic types. 9
In April or May of 2003, Reyna allegedly brought an expired Immigration and Naturalization Service Employment Eligibility Verification
Form ("1-9 form")1" to the attention of Colquitt. She informed Colquitt
that it was illegal to keep the employee on the company's payroll.
Colquitt allegedly instructed Reyna to create a false social security card
for the employee, but Reyna refused to do so. Colquitt and Dimas
allegedly prepared the false card and put it in the employee's file.
Reyna allegedly was threatened with termination when she questioned
whether
this was legal, but she did not report the incident at that
11
time.
In May 2003 Ortega learned that a plant supervisor had submitted a
benefit change form adding a wife and child to his medical insurance
without supplying documentation to substantiate the relationships.12
Ortega knew that Colquitt had hired the employee's sister as a
housekeeper and suspected that the "wife and child" were, in fact, the
employee's sister and nephew." After Ortega unsuccessfully requested
the required documentation three times, Dimas allegedly told Ortega
that Colquitt would take care of it and that Ortega should not mention

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Reyna, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 1383.
Id. at 1365-66.
Id. at 1366-67.
8 C.F.R. § 299.1 (2007).
Reyna, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.
Id.
Id.
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it again. In August 2003 both Ortega and Reyna were told to move out
of the offices they had been occupying.14
Later in August 2003, the plaintiffs met with the plant's General
Manager, Andy Harris. The plaintiffs told him that they planned to
resign due to Colquitt's racial and ethnic comments. Harris asked them
not to resign but instead to take vacations, which they agreed to do.
During the meeting, Reyna and Ortega allegedly told Harris about the
falsification of the medical insurance forms and the falsification of the
social security card. In addition, they told him that Colquitt had
demanded several prepaid vouchers for work boots, even though human
resources employees were not eligible to receive the vouchers.1"
Harris instructed the plant's Human Resources Manager, Dan
Hoggard, who was also Colquitt's supervisor, to investigate the
allegations. Hoggard did not interview Reyna or Ortega as part of his
investigation. After Reyna and Ortega returned from vacation, Colquitt
allegedly met with her subordinates and threatened to fire anyone who
brought complaints to ConAgra without coming to her first. She
relocated Ortega's office to the receptionist area, reduced her responsibil-6
ities, and required her to report to work at five o'clock in the morning.1
Harris met with Reyna on September 10, 2003 to discuss the boot
vouchers, the social security card, and the falsification of the medical
insurance. Harris asked her to give him any proof she had. Reyna told
Ortega that she needed documentation of the insurance falsification, and
Ortega typed a letter summarizing it. On September 12, 2003, Reyna
put the documentation in Harris's office. Later that day, both Reyna
and Ortega were given three-day suspensions by Colquitt and Hoggard. 7
ConAgra claimed that the documentation supporting the falsified
insurance issue included a report from a computer system to which
neither Ortega nor Reyna had access and that they were suspended
pending investigation of the apparent breach of ConAgra's confidentiality
policy. Reyna claimed she was told that she was suspended for removing
confidential information regarding the boot vouchers from the human
resources office. Ortega claimed she was told that she was suspended
for informing Harris
of the insurance issue, not for accessing the
18
computer system.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1367-68.
1368.
1368-69.
1369.
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Hoggard claimed that during the three-day suspension, he was unable
to determine how Reyna and Ortega had accessed the confidential
computer system. He met with Harris and received permission to
terminate both employees. Hoggard and Colquitt met with ConAgra's
Regional Human Resources Director and agreed that the two employees
should be terminated for violations of ConAgra's confidentiality policy.
On September 17, 2003, Reyna and Ortega were terminated in separate
meetings for violations of the confidentiality policy. The two employees
claimed that they never saw the computer system report at issue and
believed that they were terminated because they had reported Colquitt's
alleged actions regarding the boot vouchers and the insurance falsification. 19
Reyna and Ortega brought a claim in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia alleging retaliation for reporting two
incidents of fraud,2 ° activities that are protected under SOX.2 The
defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Reyna and
22
Ortega did not engage in protected activity.
Section 806 of SOX protects employees of publicly traded companies
from retaliation in the event that the employees
"provide information, cause information to be provided, or otherwise
assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which the employee
reasonably believes constitutes a violation of [18 U.S.C. §§] 1341, 1343,
1344, or 1348, any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud against
shareholders."23

Sections 1341,24 1343,25 1344,26 and 134827 cover mail fraud, wire
28
fraud, bank fraud, and securities fraud, respectively.

19. Id. at 1369-70.
20. Id. at 1380-81.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. The plaintiffs also brought claims under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000 & Supp. V 2005), Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000 & Supp. V 2005), the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1996b (2000), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000). The plaintiffs also brought state claims of negligent retention,
which are not addressed in this Article.
22. Reyna, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.
23. Id. at 1379-80 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)).
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000).

25.

18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000).

26. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000).
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2000).
28. Reyna, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 1381.
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To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under section 806,
plaintiffs must show that "(1) they engaged in protected activity; (2) the
employer knew of the protected activity; (3) they suffered an unfavorable
personnel action; and (4) circumstances are sufficient to suggest the
protected activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable action."29
Reyna and Ortega claimed that the falsification of the status of the
employee's sister and nephew to receive insurance coverage and the false
social security card created for an employee's 1-9 form were incidents of
mail and wire fraud and, therefore, reporting them was a protected
activity under SOX." ° ConAgra claimed that the employees did not
engage in protected activity under SOX because only reports of "'fraud
In
against shareholders"' were protected activities under SOX.3
addition, ConAgra claimed that even if the reports were protected
activity, it could show that the two employees would have been
terminated anyway, which constitutes a defense under SOX.32
The Eleventh Circuit has not yet addressed whether reports of fraud
must be related to shareholders to be protected activity under SOX, and
the issue is not well settled.33
Thus, to determine the meaning of SOX, the district court applied
rules of statutory construction. 4 The district court first looked to the
language of the statute and found that it "clearly protects an employee
against retaliation based upon that employee's reporting of mail fraud
or wire fraud regardless of whether that fraud involves a shareholder of
the company."3 5 The court applied the doctrine of the last antecedent
to find that the modifier of "'relating to fraud against shareholders"'
should be applied only to the last antecedent phrase and not to more
remote phrases.3" The court also looked to the "rule of punctuation" to
supplement its interpretation.3 7 Because the drafters of SOX did not
set the phrase "'relating to fraud against shareholders"' apart by a
comma, the rule of punctuation supported the interpretation that that

29. Id. at 1380 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2000); Collins v. Beazer Homes
USA, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1375 (N.D. Ga. 2004)).
30. Id. at 1381.
31. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)).
32. Id.
33. Id.; see, e.g., Livingston v. Wyeth Inc., No. 1:03CV00919, 2006 WL 2129794, at *10
(M.D.N.C. July 28, 2006) (holding that protected activity must concern shareholder fraud);
Bishop v. PCS Admin. (USA), Inc., No. 05C5683, 2006 WL 1460032 (N.D. Ill. May 23,
2006). But see Collins, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 1376.
34. Reyna, 506 F. Supp. 2d at 1382.
35.

Id.

36. Id. at 1383 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)).
37. Id.
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phrase did not apply to more than the last antecedent phrase "'any
provision of Federal law."' 38 Accordingly, the court determined that
reports of mail and wire fraud were protected activities under SOX,
regardless of whether they were related to shareholders.3 9
The district court denied ConAgra's motion for summary judgment and
found genuine issues of material fact regarding whether: (1) Reyna and
Ortega had a reasonable belief that the conduct they reported constituted mail or wire fraud, (2) Reyna and Ortega suffered an employment
harm resulting from reporting the fraud, and (3) the defendants would
have terminated them regardless of the protected activity.4"
On
January 11, 2007, plaintiff Maria Ortega filed a notice of appeal.4 '
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not yet ruled on the question of
whether section 806 of SOX protects employees who report allegations
of fraud that are unrelated to shareholder fraud, the decision in Reyna
demonstrates that courts may apply basic rules of statutory construction
to find that employees are protected. The decision in Reyna opens the
door to claims that previously would have been considered outside the
scope of SOX's protection. It will be interesting to learn whether the
Eleventh Circuit and other courts follow the Middle District of Georgia's
decision.
B.

Johnson v. Stein Mart, Inc.

In Johnson v. Stein Mart, Inc.,42 another 2007 district court case
interpreting SOX, the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida, Jacksonville Division, found that an employee's belief
that company practices were illegal was reasonable when the employer
found the belief serious enough to warrant an internal investigation.43
Because the case was before the court on a motion for summary
judgment, the court interpreted the facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Debra Johnson worked for Stein Mart, Inc. as a buyer in
various departments from April 2001 until October 2003. In the spring
of 2003, Johnson began complaining about three of Stein Mart's alleged
inventory practices. Her complaints included: (1) that the collection of
markdown allowances from vendors were misallocated between vendors

38. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id., appeal docketed, No. 08-10245-EE (11th Cir. Jan. 15, 2008).
42. No. 3:06-CV-341-J-33TEM, 2007 WL 1796265 (M.D. Fla. June 20, 2007), appeal
docketed, No. 07-13338-W (11th Cir. July 23, 2007). This case was appealed on July 19,
2007 and is scheduled for oral argument on April 21, 2008.
43. Id. at *4.
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and would not be accurately reflected on the financial statements; (2)
that season codes were changed on older inventory, which would
improperly represent inventory age; and (3) that the value of the
inventory was not properly accounted for. As part of an unrelated
investigation in September 2003, Johnson reported these three concerns
to Joe Martinolich, Stein Mart's Vice President of Loss Prevention.
Martinolich investigated Johnson's concerns but concluded that no
evidence of impropriety existed."
In October 2003 Johnson moved laterally from the buyer position to
a planner position. The planner position required her to maintain an
adequate inventory of fragrances and other merchandise in Stein Mart
stores. In November 2004 several stores reported low fragrance
inventories. Johnson and her supervisor prepared a new plan and
purchased over three hundred thousand dollars worth of new fragrance
inventory. Johnson's supervisor gave her a written performance warning
because of the low fragrance inventory. In February 2005 Johnson's
performance evaluation was again below standard, and she received a
final warning providing that she must improve her performance within
ninety days or receive further disciplinary action. As required by her
final warning, Johnson met with her supervisors every thirty days over
the next two months to discuss her performance and was told each time
that her performance had not improved sufficiently.4"
On March 14, 2005, Johnson met with Jim Delfs, Stein Mart's Chief
Financial Officer, to discuss the same three complaints regarding Stein
Mart's inventory practices and to state that she felt she was being
retaliated against for making her earlier complaints. She asked Delfs
to investigate her concerns, and he agreed to do so. Delfs subsequently
asked Martinolich to investigate Johnson's allegations. On May 10,
2005, Martinolich reported to Delfs that there was no evidence that
supported Johnson's allegations.46
Stein Mart terminated Johnson on May 19, 2005, after deciding that
she had failed to make sufficient performance improvement after she
received the final warning. On May 23, 2005, Johnson filed a complaint
with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), the
federal agency tasked with investigating administrative claims under
SOX, and she based her claim on a theory of retaliatory termination for
reporting fraudulent practices that may have impacted Stein Mart's
shareholders. OSHA determined that there was no reasonable cause to
conclude that a violation of SOX had occurred. In addition, OSHA

44.
45.
46.

Id. at *2.
Id. at *2-3.
Id. at *3.

1252

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

concluded that there was no evidence that Johnson's alleged protected
activity was a factor in Stein Mart's termination decision.47 Johnson
filed a complaint in district court, and Stein Mart moved for summary
judgment, arguing that Johnson had failed to establish a prima facie
case of retaliation. 8
The court first turned to the statute of limitations to determine the
scope of Johnson's claims. 49 Under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A 50 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, as it appears in the United States Code, actions must
be commenced no later than ninety days after the violation has
occurred. 51 The ninety-day statute of limitations runs from each
discrete act, so only the employment actions within ninety days of the
filing of Johnson's claim with OSHA were actionable.5 2 The court found
that only Johnson's termination, not her transfer, fell within the ninetyday period.5 3
To establish a prima facie case for a retaliation claim under § 1514A,
"an employee 'must show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he
engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer knew of the protected
activity; (3) he suffered an unfavorable personnel action; and (4)
circumstances exist to suggest that the protected activity was a
contributing factor to the unfavorable action. ' ' 5 4 To have "engaged in
a protected activity" an employee must show only that he or she had a
reasonable belief that a company practice violated securities laws or
regulations.55
Stein Mart argued that Johnson's belief that a violation had occurred
was not reasonable because she did not have an accounting background
or any knowledge of Stein Mart's accounting practices.5" The court
found this argument to be "without merit, since Stein Mart demonstrated that it understood the seriousness of Johnson's complaints when it
investigated her allegations."5 7 The court reasoned that "[cilearly Stein
Mart considered Johnson's beliefs to be reasonable, at least enough to

47. Id.
48. Id. at *1.
49. Id. at *3.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. V 2005).
51. Johnson, 207 WL 1796265, at *3 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D)).
52. Id. (comparing Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2169
(2007)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at *4 (quoting Bozeman v. Per-Se Techs., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1358 (N.D.
Ga. 2006)).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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warrant an internal investigation." 8 On this basis, the court found
that Johnson had engaged in protected activity.59
Stein Mart also argued that Johnson failed to show the fourth
prong-that her protected activity was a contributing factor in Stein
Mart's decision to terminate her.6" Close proximity in time may be
enough to infer causation, but the court found that the twenty months
between Johnson's original complaint in October 2003 and her termination in May 2005 was too long for such an inference. 61 The court
further stated that the twenty-month delay showed that the protected
activity was not a contributing 2factor in Stein Mart's decision to
terminate Johnson's employment.1
An employer may defend a claim of retaliatory termination by showing
by clear and convincing evidence that it would have terminated the
employee regardless of the protected activity.6" The court found that
Stein Mart's evidence showed that it terminated Johnson because of her
poor performance as an employee, not in retaliation for her complaints. 4 Stein Mart's dissatisfaction with Johnson's work was "well
documented" and the performance issues were "convincingly unrelated"
to the allegations Johnson had made.65 The court declined to act as a
"'super-personnel department'" to review Stein Mart's termination
decision.66 Thus, the court granted summary judgment on Johnson's
claim of retaliation under SOX.67 On July 19, 2007, Johnson appealed
this decision."
The decision in Johnson illustrates the delicate position of publiclytraded companies when confronted with internal allegations of financial
impropriety. If a company investigates the allegations, a court might
deem that investigation proof that the employee's belief of wrongdoing
was reasonable. If the company does not investigate, it may be found
liable for its failure to do so under SOX. The best practice for employers
is to conduct an investigation into the alleged improprieties to limit any
potential exposure under SOX and other securities laws. In addition,
employers should keep in mind that protected activity is only one piece

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C); 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii).
Johnson, 2007 WL 1796265, at *5.
Id.
Id. (quoting Bozeman, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1351-52).
Id.
Id., appeal docketed, No. 07-13338-W (11th Cir. July 23, 2007).
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of the puzzle. Liability ultimately rests on the relationship between the
protected activity and the adverse action. The decision in Johnson
provides a good example of how to limit exposure by ensuring that
proper documentation supports any adverse action that may be
questioned in the future.
II.

THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT

In Knox v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,69 the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Georgia denied summary judgment to an employer
on an employee's FMLAv° interference claim.7 The court found that
genuine issues of material fact existed when the employer did not give
the plaintiff fifteen days to return his medical certification of a serious
health condition. 2
Because the case was before the court on a motion for summary
judgment, the court interpreted the facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. The plaintiff, Richard Knox, was involved in a four-wheeler
accident during his time off from work. On September 6, 2005, Knox left
work early from Cessna Aircraft Company ("Cessna"), his employer, due
to pain from the accident. Knox went to the doctor, who prescribed a
narcotic pain killer and gave Knox a written excuse to miss work until
Monday, September 12. Knox notified his supervisor, Frank Lake, that
he would miss work until then. After returning and working for a few
hours on Monday, September 12, Knox disclosed to Susan Milner,
Cessna's Safety and Health Coordinator, that he was taking the narcotic.
Milner told Knox that he could not work while taking the narcotic and
requested that he contact his doctor to get different medication or a
home rest requirement. v3
Knox's supervisor, Lake, instructed him to contact Myra Whitley,
Cessna's Human Resources Director, as Knox had no remaining vacation
or sick time. Whitley gave Knox an FMLA request form, an FMLA
certification form, and a form notifying him of FMLA regulations. Knox
completed the FMLA request form and submitted it to Cessna. He also
contacted Whitley to determine whether he would have to call in his
absences during his time off (Cessna had a policy of terminating

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

No. 4:05-CV-131(HL), 2007 WL 2874228 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2007).
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
Knox, 2007 WL 2874228, at *13.
Id.
Id. at *1.
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employees who did not call in three times). Knox had two previous nocall absences. Whitley told Knox that he did not have to call in."4
Knox missed the next three days of work and did not call in. He
contacted Whitley on the third day to see if she had received his FMLA
certification from his doctor, which she had not. At that time, she told
Knox that he had three no-call absences. Knox informed Whitley that
he would return to work on Monday, September 19, with his FMLA
certification. After speaking with Knox, Whitley allegedly met with
Lake and Milner, and the three decided to terminate Knox on Monday,
September 19, if he did not return to work with the FMLA certification
form. However, after returning to work on Monday with his FMLA
certification, Lake and a human resources representative terminated
Knox for the three no-call absences. According to Knox, Lake told him
that the FMLA certification was irrelevant at that point.75
76
Knox filed suit alleging that his termination violated the FMLA.
Cessna filed a motion for summary judgment regarding its liability
under the FMLA.77
The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to twelve weeks of leave
during a twelve-month period for, among other things, a serious health
condition. 7' Employers may require an employee who requests leave to
provide medical certification of his or her serious health condition.79
Employers must allow an employee at least fifteen days to provide
certification for unforeseen absences."
An employee is entitled to
reinstatement to his or her position, or an equivalent position, upon his
or her return from leave."1
To establish a claim for interference with FMIA rights, an employee
must show by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was
entitled to a benefit under the FMLA and that the employer, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, denied him or her that benefit.82 An

74. Id. Cessna disputes that Knox was told he did not have to call in, but as this case
was before the court pursuant to Cessna's motion for summary judgment, the court
resolved all disputes in favor of the employee. Id. at *1 n.1, *2.
75. Id. at *2. Cessna disputes whether Knox had his certification with him, but the
court found this dispute immaterial. Id. at *2 n.4, *6 n.10.
76. Id. at *2. Knox alleged both an interference claim and a retaliation claim against
Cessna. Id. at *4. Only the interference claim is discussed in this Article.
77. Id. at *3.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2000).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 2613(a) (2000).
80. 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b) (2007).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a) (2000).
82. Knox, 2007 WL 2874228, at *4 (citing Strickland v. Water Works & Sewer Bd. of
Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1206-07 (11th Cir. 2001)).
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employer may avoid liability for failure to reinstate an employee after
his or her leave by showing that it terminated the employee for a reason
unrelated to the FMLA leave. 3
Here, Cessna claimed that Knox was terminated for violating the callin policy. Knox claimed that the FMLA does not allow call-in policies to
8 4
be used to deny an employee's FMLA rights.
The FMLA, however,
does not prohibit employers from requiring that employees follow a callin policy.8 5 The regulations require that an employee give his or her
employer notice of the need for unforeseeable leave as soon as practicable under the circumstances.86 The FMLA does not limit an employer's
right to know whether an employee will be at work that day to enable
the employer to make alternate arrangements.87
Knox also claimed that the call-in policy could not be applied to him
because he never received notice of it as required by the FMLA. s The
FMLA requires that employees receive written notice of their rights and
obligations under the FMLA. 89 However, the FMLA does not require
an employer to give written notice of a call-in policy.9"
Finally, Knox claimed that genuine issues of material fact existed
regarding whether he was terminated for violation of the call-in policy.
Knox relied on evidence that he had asked Whitley whether he had to
call in during his leave, to which Whitley replied that Knox did not and
that she would notify his supervisors. In addition, Whitley was involved
in the termination decision.91 The district court concluded that a jury
could find that Knox was terminated for taking FMLA
leave, not for
92
violating a policy he was told he did not have to follow.
The district court focused on the evidence that Whitley, Lake, and
Milner met on Friday, September 16 and decided that Knox would be
terminated if he did not bring his FMLA certification to work on
Monday, September 19. 9 3 The district court concluded that this could
support a finding that Knox was not fired for the failure to call in but,

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *5.
86. 29 C.F.R. § 825.303 (2007).
87. Knox, 2007 WL 2874228, at *5.
88. Id. at *4.
89. 29 C.F.R. § 825.301 (2007).
90. Id. The regulation states, "The specific notice may include other information--e.g.,
whether the employer will require periodic reports of the employee's status and intent to
return to work, but is not required to do so." Id. § 825.301(b)(2).
91. Knox, 2007 WL 2874228, at *4-6.
92. Id. at *6.
93. Id.
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rather, for returning to work without his FMLA certification.94
Because September 19 was less than fifteen days after the request for
certification on September 12, the court ruled that a reasonable jury
could find a "clear violation of FMLA." 95 In addition, there was
evidence that Lake had stated to Whitley as early as September 12,
before Knox failed to call in, that he wanted to fire Knox.96 Thus, the
district court found that there were genuine issues of material fact
regarding whether Knox was fired for violating the call-in policy, and
therefore, the court denied summary judgment to Cessna.9 7
This case demonstrates that an employer must ensure that it has
provided appropriate notice and leave time under the FMLA before
deciding to terminate. While an employer has the right to require an
employee to call in when he or she is going to miss work due to a serious
health condition under the FMLA, evidence that the employee's failure
to call in was not the real reason for the termination can lead to liability
for the employer.
III.

THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

Recent cases within the Eleventh Circuit address two hot topics in
litigation under the FLSA:98 (1) the "bona fide executive" exemption 99
and (2) noncompensable preliminary and postliminary activities under
the Portal-to-Portal Act.100
A.

Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Construction, Inc.

In Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Construction,Inc.,° the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that time spent by
workers traveling on a bus to a construction site within a secured area
and time spent going through security screening is not compensable
under the FLSA. °2 Construction workers employed by Baker Concrete
Construction, Inc. ("Baker") were hired to work on a project at Miami
International Airport. The construction took place within the secured
section of the airport.
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA")

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *7.
97. Id.
98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
99. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2000).
100. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (2000). Preliminary and postpreliminary actions are
addressed in § 254(a).
101. 487 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 813 (2007).
102. Id. at 1340-41.
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regulations do not allow unauthorized vehicles in secured areas. To
travel to the work location, the FAA required the workers to be screened
then to travel by employer-provided
through a security checkpoint and
10 3
transportation to the worksite.

The workers did not perform any labor while they waited for the
transportation, either before or after their shift. They carried their
safety gear such as goggles, hard hats, and work boots, but they did not
carry tools. The workers received their instructions for the day at the
worksite after signing in. At the end of their shifts, the workers signed
out and then boarded the bus. Baker did not pay the workers for the
time spent waiting for or riding the bus. The workers did not claim that
Baker ever discussed paying them for that time. °4
The workers brought a claim in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida under the FLSA for the time spent going
through security screening and the time spent riding the bus.11 5 The
district court granted summary judgment for the employer after finding
that the time was exempted from compensation under the Portal-toPortal Act.'0 6 The workers appealed. The Eleventh Circuit then
reviewed the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.' °7
Under the Portal-to-Portal Act, an employer need not pay wages for
some worker activities under the FLSA.' °8 The FLSA excludes from
compensable activity:
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of
performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee
is employed to perform, and
(2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said
principal activity or activities, which occur either prior to the time on
any particular workday at which such employee commences, or
subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases,
such principal activity or activities.'0 9

Activities that are compensable by contract or custom are not exempted
under this provision.1
Here, however, the workers did not point to

103.

Id. at 1341.

104.

Id.

105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1340.
Id. at 1340-41.
Id. at 1341-42.

108. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2000).
109. Id.
110. Id. § 254(b).
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a contract or custom requiring payment for the waiting or screening
time."'
The district court had found it undisputed that the workers were hired
to perform their duties at the construction site inside the secured area
of the airport. The court also had found it undisputed that11the workers
did not perform any labor during the trip to the worksite. '
The Eleventh Circuit looked to the plain meaning of the statute and
framed the issue as whether the workers were "engaging in any workrelated activity before arriving
at" the construction site inside the
13
secured area of the airport.
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the issue of the travel time."'
Under the Portal-to-Portal Act, mere travel is exempt." 5 However, if
workers are engaged in a work-related activity that is "'integral and
indispensable'" to the work, then travel time afterwards is not exempt16
under the Portal-to-Portal Act and is compensable under the FLSA."
The court noted that whether the workers were required to carry their
safety gear on the bus was in dispute but found that dispute immaterial
because the result under the Portal-to-Portal Act would be the same." 7
To determine whether the time was compensable, the Eleventh Circuit
looked to the interpretive statements issued by the Department of Labor
concerning 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)."' The interpretive statements describe
examples of traveling that normally would be considered "preliminary"
or "postliminary" activities, including:
"(1) walking or riding by an employee between the plant gate and the
employee's lathe, workbench or other actual place of performance of his
principal activity or activities; (2) riding on buses between a town and
an outlying mine or factory where the employee is employed; and (3)
riding on buses or trains from a logging camp to a particular site at
which the logging operations are actually being conducted."119
Based on the persuasive value of the Department of Labor's interpretive
statement, the Eleventh Circuit held that the time spent riding the

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Bonilla, 487 F.3d at 1342 n.2.
Id. at 1342.
Id.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1).
Bonilla, 487 F.3d at 1342 (quoting IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 37 (2005)).
Id.
Id. at 1342-43.
Id. at 1343 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 790.7(f) (2007)).
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buses to0 the construction site was exempt from compensation under the
12
FLSA.
The court next addressed the claim for compensation for the time
spent going through the required security screening. 12' Activities that
are preliminary and postliminary to the principal activities are exempt
under 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2) of the Portal-to-Portal Act. 122 Preliminary
and postliminary activities are neither "'integral and indispensable"' to
the principal work activity for which the workers were hired nor
exempted under § 254(a)(1). 123 Factors to assess whether an activity
is integral and indispensable include: "(1) whether the activity is
required by the employer, (2) whether the activity is necessary for the
and (3) whether the activity
employee to perform his or her1 2duties,
4
primarily benefits the employer."
Here, the screening was required by the FAA, but Baker did not
benefit from it.' 25 The Eleventh Circuit determined that "integral and
indispensable" is narrower than "mere causal necessity" as otherwise
noncompensable commuting time is normally a necessity before most
employees begin work.' 2' The court held that an integral and indispensable activity must work to the benefit of the employer.' 27 The
court determined that because the security screening required by the
FAA did not benefit Baker, the time spent by the workers going through
screening was not compensable." 8 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit
1 29
affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Baker.
The Eleventh Circuit had not interpreted the Portal-to-Portal Act in
a published decision since the Supreme Court's decision in IBP,Inc. v.
Alvarez, 3 ' in which the Court held that time spent waiting to don and
doff protective gear was not compensable under the Act.' 3 ' The
holding in Bonilla demonstrates that the Eleventh Circuit will weigh
heavily whether an activity benefits the employer in determining

120. Id.
121. Id. at 1344.
122. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a)(2).
123. Bonilla, 487 F.3d at 1344 (quoting Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 256 (1956)).
124. Id. (citing Dunlop v. City Elec., Inc., 527 F.2d 394, 398-401 (5th Cir. 1976)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1345.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 546 U.S. 21 (2005).
131. Bonilla, 487 F.3d at 1344-45 (citing IBP, 546 U.S. at 42). The Eleventh Circuit
distinguished the facts in its unpublished decision in Burton v. HillsboroughCounty, 181
Fed. App'x 829 (11th Cir. 2006). For a discussion of Burton, see W. Christopher Arbery &
Valerie N. Njiiri, Labor and Employment, 58 MERCER L. REV. 1295, 1295-99 (2007).
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whether preliminary or postliminary activity is integral or indispensable
to the work that employees are primarily hired to do.
B. Allen v. Dolgencorp, Inc.
In another wage and hour decision, Allen v. Dolgencorp, Inc.,1 2 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
granted summary judgment for an employer, holding that store
managers were exempt executive employees even though they spent up
to eighty-five percent of their time performing nonexempt tasks. 133
Because the case was before the court on a motion for summary
judgment, the court interpreted the facts in the light most favorable to
the plaintiffs. Dolgencorp, Inc. ("Dolgencorp" or the "Employer")
operates Dollar General Stores. Each Dollar General store has a store
manager who reports to a district manager. An assistant store manager,
a lead clerk, and four to five clerks report to the store manager. The
district manager is responsible for fifteen to twenty-five stores, but does
not have keys to the stores.'
Store managers receive two weeks of in-store training and two weeks
of classroom training. They are compensated on a salary basis and are
eligible to receive a bonus based on store performance. Store managers
may work as much as sixty to seventy-five hours per week. Although
the duties of the store managers vary, all are responsible for hiring
clerks, ensuring that standardized procedures are followed by all
employees, managing the payroll budget, and disciplining store
employees.
Dollar General stores have detailed procedures and
merchandising plans that the store managers are required to follow. In
addition, district managers visit the stores on average once a month, for
thirty minutes to three hours, primarily to meet with the store
managers.
Moreover, some district managers would leave voice
messages for store managers as frequently as every day. 35
Seven Dollar General store managers brought claims under the FLSA
for unpaid overtime compensation against Dolgencorp.' 36 Dolgencorp

132. 513 F. Supp. 2d 1215 (N.D. Ala. 2007), appeal docketed, No. 07-14569-V (11th Cir.
Oct. 1, 2007). This case was appealed on September 25, 2007 and is scheduled for oral
argument on May 20, 2008.
133. Id. at 1232.
134. Id. at 1217.
135. Id. at 1217-22.
136. Id. at 1216-17. The seven store managers originally opted into an FLSA collective
action, which was subsequently decertified, and the plaintiffs were allowed to refile
individually. More than two thousand plaintiffs were named in one complaint. The case
was severed into individual cases, and these seven cases were selected by the parties to be
expedited for disposition. Id. at 1217 n.2.
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moved for summary judgment, claiming that the store managers
qualified as exempt executive employees.13 7
The FLSA requires that employers pay their employees a premium
equal to one and one-half times their regular rate for hours worked in
excess of forty hours in one week.13 The overtime requirement does
not apply to employees who qualify for specific exemptions included in
the FLSA, such as the bona fide executive employee exemption. 39 The
employer has the burden to prove that an employee meets an FLSA
exemption. 4 ° The Department of Labor ("DOL") is authorized by
Congress to promulgate regulations to define and delineate the
exemptions, and these regulations must be "given controlling weight
unless they are ... manifestly contrary to the statute." 4
The court based its analysis on the regulations regarding the executive
exemption in effect prior to the August 2004 amendments because all
but one of the store managers ceased working for the employer before
that time. 4 2 Under the previous regulations, the "long test" for the
executive exemption had been used for employees who earned between
$155 and $250 per week.' 43 However, because all of the store managers earned at least $250 per week, the court turned to the "short
test."14 4 The short test required exempt executive employees to "(1) be
paid on a salary basis of not less than $250 per week (2) for the primary
duty of managing a recognized department or subdivision and (3)
regularly direct two or more employees."' 45
It was undisputed that the first and third prongs of the short test
were met by the store managers.146 To determine whether the store
managers' primary duty was management, the court turned to the DOL
regulations. 47 The store managers agreed that they performed many
of the managerial activities described in the regulations, such as
interviewing, selecting, and training employees; directing their work;

137. Id. at 1216.
138. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2000).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2000).
140. Allen, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
141. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
142. Allen, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 n.23 (discussing that the change to the "short test"
and whether or not the employee's suggestions regarding hiring or employee discipline
were given particular weight were not in dispute as applied to the one manager employed
after 2004).
143. Id. at 1224 (citing regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(a)-(f) (2004) in effect prior to
August 23, 2004).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1224-25.
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appraising employee performance and disciplining employees; and
allocating and monitoring the work.148 However, the store managers
argued that because they spent as much as eighty-five percent of their
time on nonexempt tasks, such as merchandising and cleaning, their
primary duty was not "management" as defined by the regulations.14 9
Under the regulations, if an employee spends more than fifty percent
of his or her time on management activities, then management is the
employee's primary duty.5 ° Because the store managers spent less
than fifty percent of their time on exempt management duties, however,
the court evaluated the factors in the regulations regarding the executive
exemption to determine whether management was their primary
duty. 1 ' The factors the court evaluated were:
"[1] the relative importance of managerial duties as compared with
other types of duties, [2] the frequency with which the employee
exercises discretionary powers, [3] his relative freedom from supervision, and [4] the relationship between his salary and the wages paid
other employees for the kind of non-exempt work performed by the
supervisor." "'

The court found that the first factor-the importance of managerial
duties-supported a finding that the store managers were exempt
executive employees. 1 3 The four weeks of formal training, the criteria
on which the store managers were evaluated, and their compensation,
including the bonus based on store performance, all demonstrated that
the employer valued the management functions performed by the store
managers more highly than the nonexempt duties they also performed.5 4 Although the store managers might have spent most of
their time performing nonexempt tasks, such as stocking store shelves,
they also were acting as store managers by ensuring that company
policies were followed.'
As managers, they were in charge of the

148. Id. at 1225 (quoting regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 541.102 (2004) in effect prior to
August 23, 2004).
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing regulations at 29 C.F.R. § 541.103 (2004) in effect prior to August 23,
2004).
151. Id. The regulations stated that time alone is not determinative; there are various
factors that courts may consider. Id. at 1225-26.
152. Id. at 1226 (brackets in original) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.103).
153. Id. at 1226-27.
154. Id. at 1226.
155. Id. at 1226-27.
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store and arguably had control of it, even though that control was
limited by standardized procedures.15
The court found that the second factor-the employee's discretionary
power-supported a finding that the store managers were exempt
executive employees.'57 Although the employer provided the store
managers with detailed instructions and frequent contact from district
managers, the store managers still exercised discretion within those
constraints.' 58 The court found it significant that the store managers
created work schedules, assigned and prioritized tasks, counseled
employees, managed budgets, implemented company policies, and dealt
'
with customer complaints. 59
In addition, the store managers had the
60
power to recommend the termination and promotion of employees.
The court found that the store managers' operation within detailed
procedures was not a bar to a finding of discretion because
many of their
61
decisions affected the success or failure of their stores.'
The court also found that the third factor-the store managers'
relative freedom from supervision-supported a finding of management
as a primary duty.'62 Although some store managers received daily
voice messages from their district managers, it was undisputed that the
63
store manager generally was the highest level employee in the store.'
In addition, the court determined that the fourth factor-the
compensation comparison between store managers and other employees-supported the classification as exempt.'6
Store managers'
salaries averaged twice as much as the wages earned by assistant
managers, the next highest compensated store employees.' 65 The store
managers argued that a comparison of their hourly rate, their salary
divided by hours worked, would not be so dramatic; however, the
regulations clearly provide for a comparison of the salaried manager's
16
salary to the employee's hourly wages.
As all four factors supported a finding that the store managers had the
primary duty of management and, therefore, were exempt executive
employees, the district court considered whether summary judgment was

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1227.
at 1228.
at 1227.

at 1227-28.
at 1228.
at 1229.
at 1228.
(citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.103).
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appropriate.'
The court reviewed decisions based on similar facts
made by other district courts within the Eleventh Circuit, decisions
made by other circuits, and an Eleventh Circuit affirmation of summary
judgment on the administrative exemption. 68 The court found further
support for summary judgment in an example included in the DOL
regulations, which described an employee who spent less than fifty
percent of his time on nonexempt duties as having management as his
primary duty.169 Finding the application of an exemption to undisputed facts to be a question of law, the court granted the employer's motion
for summary judgment. 170 The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on
September 25, 2007.71

This case illustrates the fact that a court will look past job titles to
determine whether employees in fact meet the various tests for
exemption from overtime compensation under the FLSA. It also
indicates that an employee might have managerial duties as his or her
primary responsibility, even when up to eighty-five percent of his or her
time is spent on the same tasks as nonexempt employees, so long as the
primary duty factors support such a finding. The court's decision should
be an important reminder to employers to always focus on the employee's actual duties, instead of the job title, to determine whether the
employee falls under any overtime exemption.

167. Id. at 1229-30.
168. Hogan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 621 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Murray v.
Stuckey's Inc., 939 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1991); Donovan v. Burger King Corp., 672 F.2d 221
(1st Cir. 1982); Posely v. Eckerd Corp., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2006); Moore v.
Tractor Supply Co., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1268 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
169. Allen, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 1231 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 541.103).
170. Id. at 1232.
171. Id., appeal docketed, No. 07-14569-V (11th Cir. Oct. 1, 2007).

